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The Use of Discretion in German Law
Ernst K. Pakuschert
In the Federal Republic of Germany the exercise of administra-
tive discretion is more narrowly confined than in the United States.
The German attitude toward the use of discretion reflects concern
about the proper division of legislative and executive functions, the
protection of individual rights, and the maintenance of a state based
on the rule of law. On the other hand, because of the complex prob-
lems of the German welfare state, it is recognized that administrators
should be given a degree of discretion in weighing special circumstan-
ces in individual cases. Judge Pakuscher outlines the manner in
which these conflicting attitudes about the use of discretion have
been reconciled doctrinally.and have been accommodated through a
system of specialized administrative courts exercising limited review
of executive decisions.
In Professor Davis's excellent book Discretionary Justice: A
Preliminary Inquiry,' he observes that William Pitt's remark,
"Where law ends tyranny begins," might today appropriately read,
"Where law ends, discretion begins."2 Professor Davis eloquently
describes the potential for injustice that is posed by the uncon-
trolled exercise of discretion by government authorities; but he also
finds a positive aspect to the use of discretion. "Discretion is a tool,
indispensable for individualization of justice. . . .Rules alone,
untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of
modern government and of modern justice. Discretion is our princi-
pal source of creativeness in government and in law."'3 Because of
this promising side to the use of discretion, Professor Davis sets
forth the following goal for the legal system: "Where law ends indi-
vidualized justice begins."' Bearing this goal in mind, I prepared the
following article on the role and the control of discretion in the law
of the Federal Republic of Germany.
t Chief Judge of the Federal Patent Court of the Federal Republic of Germany, former
Judge of the Federal Supreme Court for Administrative Cases, Dr. iur. (Munich 1952), LL.M.
(Berkeley 1956).
K. DAVIS, DIscRETIoNARY JUSTIE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
2 Id. at 3.
Id. at 25.
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Discretion in German Law
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
After the National Socialist regime and the four-year postwar
interregnum, the legal framework of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many was established with the proclamation of the Basic Law on
May 23, 1949. The constitutional scheme of the Federal Republic
of Germany is designed to protect individual rights against govern-
mental power, but it also imposes on the government the complex
responsibilities of a modem social welfare state. These two compet-
ing emphases within the constitutional framework are spoken of as
the principle of the Rechtsstaat-the state based upon the rule of
law-and the principle of the Sozialstaat.
Although the Constitution does not specifically address the
subject of discretion, the exercise of discretion by public authorities
necessarily raises constitutional questions about the relationships
among the three branches of government 5 and between the rights of
the individual and the power of the state.' For authoritative answers
to these questions, one must look to the opinions of the Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) at Karlsruhe.7
A. The Legislature and the Executive-the Grant of Discretion
The usual, though not the only, sphere of discretionary power
in the Federal Republic of Germany is the exercise of discretion by
an officer of the executive branch acting pursuant to statutory
authorization. In this context the authority, indeed the duty, to
make a discretionary decision is conferred on the administrator so
that a legislative program can be more effectively and justly imple-
5 The Basic Law, or Constitution, of the Federal Republic of Germany establishes the
principle of separation of powers betwen the legislative, executive, and judicial organs.
GRUNDGESTZ [GG] art. 20, para. 2.
GG ch. I (Basic Rights).
7 This Court is unique both in its structure and in its role within the judiciary of the
Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Constitutional Court was created by Federal Act
of March 12, 1951, [1951] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 243. The justices of the Court's two
Senates (Divisions) are elected by special bodies of the Parliament and appointed by the
President of the Federal Republic of Germany, generally for twelve-year terms without any
possibility of being reappointed. The main task of the Federal Constitutional Court is taken
from the tradition of the United States Supreme Court-it has the power to rule on the
constitutionality of legislative acts. However, the Federal Constitutional Court is a special
court that decides only constitutional questions submitted to it by general courts in the course
of pending litigation, or by individual parties who have exhausted their other legal remedies
through recourse to civil, criminal or other courts. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court is
not a "Super-Supreme Court," entitled to set aside lower court decision, but merely an
independent special tribunal for constitutional questions. Its decisions are binding with the
force of law upon the executive, legislature, and judiciary.
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mented. In essence, the administrator is allowed to make the most
appropriate choice in each case from among several equally legal
alternatives. This grant of discretion may be distinguished from the
situation, termed bound administration (gebundene Verwaltung),
where the administrator is required to reach the one result that
would be legal under each set of circumstances as defined by stat-
ute.
The Federal Constitutional Court has declared legislative
grants of discretion to be consonant with the rule of law and not in
violation of the constitutional relationship between the legislature
and the executive. However, it has held unconstitutional laws that
delegate discretionary power without furnishing guidelines for its
exercise. In one case decided in 1958, a regulation that made the
planting of vine shoots subject to an official permit, without indicat-
ing the conditions under which the permit was to be granted, was
declared unconstitutional. 8 A similar result was reached in 1966
with respect to a law that made the taking of public collections
subject to a special permit, without clarifying the conditions under
which the permit was to be given.' In these cases in which the
legislature failed to provide standards for deciding whether or not
to grant a permit, the unguided power thus conferred upon the
administrator was held to violate the Constitution. 10
A different result was reached in a case challenging the consti-
tutionality of a federal law that imposed a fine for the nonuse of
import licenses." The statute permitted but did not require an
administrative officer to restrain from exacting the fine if the licen-
see was not at fault for the nonuse, 12 thus leaving the decision in
such cases to the administrator's discretion. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of this grant of discretion, noting that although the
Constitution requires that a statute clearly set forth the circumstan-
ces in which an administrator may interfere with an individual's
legally protected rights, it does not require the legislature to bind
an administrator to interfere in every case, or to prescribe the exact
circumstances in which an administrator may refrain from interfer-
8 Judgment of July 10, 1958, 8 BVerfGE 71.
Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 150.
,D See GG art. 80 (requiring that any statute authorizing the federal government, a
federal minister, or the state governments to issue ordinances having the force of law must
set forth the content, purpose, and scope of the authorization).
" Judgment of Feb. 3, 1959, 9 BVerfGE 137. During the early 1950s the federal govern-
ment was actively engaged in the regulation of imports to control the balance of payments
deficit. Licenses were issued in limited numbers to importers; to prevent abuses of the system
a fine was authorized for nonuse of a license.
12 Law of Dec. 27, 1951, [1951] BGB 11005.
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ence. The limited discretion involved in the decision not to interfere
is constitutional, if exercised in accordance with the purpose of the
statute.
B. The Executive and the Judiciary-the Review of Discretion
Judicial review of administrative actions is recognized in Arti-
cle 95 of the Basic Law which establishes a separate Federal Su-
preme Court, whose jurisdiction extends in principle to any admin-
istrative act. Administrative law courts 3 are not permitted to review
the expediency of discretionary decisions, but can, and do, review
their legality-whether the law was correctly applied, whether the
administrative authority stayed within the limits of its discretion,
and whether the decision was free from extraneous considerations.
As the Federal Constitutional Court has stressed, the availability of
review by independent courts helps make discretionary powers
within the executive branch constitutionally tolerable., In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the statute in the import license case
mentioned above, the Court emphasized that when disputes arose
about an administrative officer's decision not to waive the fine, a
full judicial review of the administrative decision would be available
to determine whether the administrator had disregarded the pur-
poses of the law, or the constitutional right of equal treatment.
C. Individual Rights and Discretionary Power
The most fundamental constitutional issues raised by the use
of discretion pertain to constitutionally protected rights. A case
illustrating this point involved a challenge to a provision of the
Federal Law on Passport Matters 5 setting forth the conditions for
the denial of a passport by the administrative authorities. Because
the freedom to travel outside the Federal Republic of Germany is
considered to be a basic component of the general rights of liberty
secured by Article 2 of the Constitution,"' the issuance of a passport
'3 The top administrative law court is the Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) in Berlin. Administrative trial courts and courts of appeals are
state (Land) courts.
" Judgment of June 16, 1959, 9 BVerfGE 338, 353.
Law of Mar. 4, 1952, [1952] BGB1 1 290.
" (1) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in
so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order
or the moral code.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person. The liberty
of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant
to a law.
GG art. 2.
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may be compelled by court action. Section 7 of the challenged stat-
ute provides that a passport shall not be issued if granting a pass-
port to the applicant would endanger the internal or external secu-
rity "or other essential interests" of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The Constitutional Court emphasized that the imprecise
phrase "other essential interests" carried with it the danger that the
denial of passports would be left to the unreviewable discretion of
administrative officers. 17 If that were so, the provision would be
unconstitutional, for the legislature may not delegate to the execu-
tive the authority to define the boundaries of individual liberties
"by means of an indeterminate general clause."'" However, the
court was able to avoid this result by interpreting the ambiguous
phrase not as a grant of discretion, but as an "indefinite legal con-
cept,"' 19 which meant that its application was fully reviewable by the
administrative law courts."
In sum, administrative discretion is clearly established within
the constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany, but its
position is highly sensitive to the balance between the state and the
individual and to the allocation of roles among the legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial branches in maintaining that balance. With this
perspective we may now turn to a brief survey of discretion within
several areas of German law and problems presented in particular
cases.
I. A SURVEY OF THE USE OF DISCRETION IN GERMAN LAW
A. The Scope of Discretion
In the Federal Republic of Germany the degree of discretion
that may be delegated to government authorities varies widely, de-
pending on such factors as the nature of the discretionary choice and
whether basic individual rights are at stake. The German system of
initiation of prosecution for serious criminal offenses, which has
received considerable attention in America,20 is one area where little
or no discretion is allowed.
Contrary to the American practice, in the Federal Republic of
, Judgment of Jan. 16, 1957, 6 BVerfGE 32.
,s Id. at 42.
" When a statutory term is determined to be an indefinite legal concept, e.g., "the needs
of the public," "necessity," "reliability," "fitness for a purpose," its interpretation is re-
garded as a question of law and therefore subject to complete review by the courts.
0 See, e.g., Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecu-
torial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 468 (1974); Langbein, Controlling Prosecu-
torial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 439 (1974).
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Germany the decision of a prosecutor to file a bill of indictment, and
the decision of a judge to fix a date for trial based on the preliminary
findings of the prosecutor, involve very little discretion. Under sec-
tion 152(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor is
obliged to act on information concerning any punishable criminal
act. Accordingly, if a prosecutor is informed of a possible crime, he
must immediately initiate an investigation, 21 and if his investigation
reveals sufficient cause, he must file a bill of indictment.2 2 Simi-
larly, if there is sufficient evidence that the accused has committed
a punishable act, the court must hold a plenary trial.2 The decisions
of the prosecutor and the judge are not, strictly speaking, discretion-
ary rulings, but represent the application of specific statutory provi-
sions and are subject to full judicial review by appellate courts. 24
Accordingly, under German law, a prosecutor or a judge may be
liable for damages for having negligently instituted a criminal pro-
ceeding-a possibility that would not be present if the prosecutor
or judge had any discretion in the matter.
At the opposite extreme are cases where an administrator has
nearly full discretion in making a particular decision. An illustra-
tion of broad discretion is the so-called administrative political dis-
cretion doctrine .2 Administrative political discretion is involved, for
example, in a decision of the executive to build a new street or to
establish a new town. Such decisions are generally exempt from
judicial control.2 This policy of noninterference follows from the
general principle of the separation of powers and from the inevita-
bility that the interpretation of terms like "public interests"
(biffentliche Belange) in such cases will involve discretion. For ex-
ample, the conception underlying the plan of a new community will
determine what corresponds to or violates "public interests" in
executing that plan. Despite the demand for a full judicial review
of discretionary decisions, administrative spheres such as these con-
tinue to be exempt from judicial control. These spheres of discretion
ought to be respected.
21 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] § 160(1).
" STPO § 170(1).
2 STPO § 203.
21 E.g., STPO § 172 (where the victim presses charges); STPO § 210(2) (other cases).
2Judgment of June 18, 1970, BGH (Nirnberg), in 23 NEUE JURISTsCH. WOCHENSCHRivr
[NJW] 1543 (1970).
1, Kelner, Einiges zum behardlichen Ermessen, 1969 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG
[DOV] 309, 311.
21 H. Rupp, GRUNDFRAGEN DER HEUTIGEN VERWALTUNGSLEHRE 209 (1965).
" GG art. 20(2).
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Between these extremes, the scope of discretion granted to the
executive branch varies widely, depending on the terms of the stat-
ute, the requirements of the Constitution, and the principle of the
rule of law. A 1971 decision of the Federal Supreme Court concern-
ing the system in use in the Federal Republic of Germany for pro-
tecting children from pornographic materials exemplifies the sensi-
tivity of the judiciary to the different factors affecting the scope of
discretion."' By Federal Act of June 9, 1953 a special federal agency
(Bundespraifstelle) was established for the registration of literature,
records, and films apt to endanger the morals of children or juve-
niles." The registration must be published in an index, and after
publication the item concerned may not be sold, let, or otherwise
made accessible to children or juveniles. The Federal Supreme
Court ruled that the agency is authorized to use its discretion in
evaluating whether or not an item should be placed on the register.
The statute requires that to be registrable a work must be "apt to
endanger juveniles."'" This prerequisite had previously been con-
sidered nondiscretionary, that is, allowing only one correct decision
on each set of facts. However, before a certain work may be banned
not only do facts have to be ascertained and measured against perti-
nent statutory provisions, but an evaliative decision is called for.
The assumption that the term "apt to endanger juveniles" allows
only one correct decision therefore must be considered false. Due to
the nature of the subject matter, the potential range of legally valid
decisions is broad.32
Furthermore, the decision-making agency embodies an impor-
tant element of social representation. The agency operates through
a panel of twelve members, including its President, three officials
appointed from various states (Ldnder) of the Federal Republic of
Germany, and eight members chosen from among the authors of
literary or artistic works, publishers, booksellers, youth organiza-
tions, youth welfare institutions, teachers' associations, and
churches. In order to register a work as endangering juveniles, a two-
thirds majority of those taking part in the decision is required with
at least seven members of the panel voting with the majority. Thus,
the composition of the board combines professional knowledge with
elements of representation, allowing various social groups to exer-
Judgment of Dec. 16, 1971, 39 BVerwGE 197.
3* [1953] BGB1 1 377, amended by [1961] BGB 1 497.
31 Id.
32 Redeker, Fragen der Kontrolldichte verwaltungsgerichtlicher Rechtsprechung, 1971
DOV 757, 762.
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cise their influence in individual cases. Under these circumstances,
the Federal Supreme Court deemed it improper for an administra-
tive law court, aided by court-appointed experts, to set aside the
decision of the panel.3
This does not mean that decisions of the board are exempt from
judicial review. On the contrary, administrative law courts may
determine whether the board has ascertained the pertinent facts
correctly and completely, whether it has observed the appropriate
standards in these matters, and whether it has given sufficient rea-
sons for its decision. Otherwise, the decision of the board will be set
aside. 4
B. Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisions.
Under section 114 of the Rules of Procedure for Administrative
Law Courts, 3 the courts must fully review decisions of administra-
tors for errors of law and for mistakes in ascertaining the necessary
facts, but may not review the wisdom of administrative decisions.
Two cases involving the regulation of civil service employees illus-
trate the manner in which administrative law courts apply this
scope of review to different types of discretionary action by govern-
ment authorities.
The first case involved the denial of a special permit required
for a member of the civil service to take on a paid part-time job.
According to the statutory rules, the civil service employer has dis-
cretion to grant the permit. Examples given by the statutes indicate
that the permit must be denied if the part-time activities would
either be incompatible with the status of the official or would take
so much of his time or working capacity that the full performance
of his official duties would be jeopardized. The local court for ad-
ministrative law cases at Dfisseldof has ruled that the discretion to
grant or deny a permit is limited by the official interest of the
governmental authority involved. 6 Thus, if the official position of
the civil servant provides no grounds to restrict his freedom to look
- Judgment of Dec. 16, 1971, 39 BVerwGE 197, 204.
31 This judgment of the Federal Supreme Court has met with general approval, but
also with some mild and sharp criticism. See Ott, Die neue Rechtsprechung des Bundesver-
waltungsgerichts zum literarischen Jugendschutz in verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht, 25 NJW
1219 (1972); Mfiller, Annot., 25 NJW 1587 (1972); Schmidt-Salzer, Annot., 87 DE'scHE
VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVBI] 391 (1972); Ule, Unbestimmte Begriffe und Ermessen im
Umweltschutzrecht, 88 DVB1 756, 762 (1973).
VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG [VwGO] § 114.
Judgment of Sept. 19, 1973, VG Dfisseldorf, in 53 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG [DRiZ]
24 (1975).
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for part-time work, a permit must be granted. To effectuate review,
the court required that when denying a permit the civil service
employer must disclose all the factual circumstances and the rea-
soning that formed the basis of the decision. Only by a full disclo-
sure will the courts be able to ascertain whether or not a case in-
volves an abuse of discretion. In the reported case the contested
denial was set aside and the agency was instructed to consider and
decide the matter de novo pursuant to the ruling of the court.17
The second decision involved the vice principal of an elemen-
tary school, who had been transferred to another school over her
objection .3 The transfer was due to long-standing tensions between
the vice principal and her superior, the principal of her old school.
She filed an action to prevent her transfer, and the local administra-
tive law court dismissed her suit. Her first appeal was unsuccessful,
but on an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court the case was
remanded for a new trial. Under the pertinent statute a civil servant
may be transferred to another post upon his request or for official
needs." The transfer in this case was purportedly for official needs.
While the Federal Supreme Court demanded a judicial review
of the finding of an "official need" (dienstliches Bediirfnis), it
stepped back from interfering with the placement of individual
members of the civil service. The court ruled that whether the plain-
tiff or her superior had to be transferred was a decision resting
within the power of those responsible for planning and administer-
ing the school system. Nevertheless, the case was remanded to the
lower court, which had erroneously deemed itself bound to accept
the decision of the school authority without examining whether the
principle of proportionality (Prinzip der Verhdltnismdssigkeit) had
been observed-for example, whether there had been an effort to
reconcile the plaintiff with her colleagues or supervisors so that a
transfer could be avoided.
Thus, despite the desire and need for full judicial review, the
courts are careful not to interfere with the daily work of the execu-
tive branch if at all possible. In the second case this attitude meant
that, although the court did not refrain from reviewing the contested
- Cf. 23 NJW 2313, 2314 (1970) (reporting another decision of the Federal Administra-
tive Court concerned with the borderlines of discretion in proceedings over permits for part-
time professional activity).
Judgment of Jan. 25, 1967, 26 BVerwGE 65, confirmed in Judgment of Mar. 19, 1969,
31 BVerwGE 345, 358.
11 Beamtengesetz [Law on the status of civil servants] for das Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen [LBG], as published June 1, 1962, § 28, [1962] Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt
fir das Land Nordrhrein-Westfalen [GV NW] 271.
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decision, it accepted a significant and perhaps decisive factor as
resting within the special expertise of the authority involved."
While the Federal Constitutional Court has placed considerable
emphasis on the availability of judicial review of discretionary ac-
tion, there is some empirical evidence that judicial review plays only
a small role in controlling the executive. One of Professor Davis's
pupils and admirers, Stephan Von Welck, conducted an
investigation of thirty-eight state authorities in charge of requests
of citizens for changes of their names.41 Under the relevant law,4" the
administrative authority can grant a requested change in family
name only if the change is justified by an "important reason." The
meaning of the term "important reason" has been spelled out by
special directives of the Federal Government that are binding on the
authorities involved.43 If the authority comes to the conclusion that
an important reason exists, it must then decide whether the change
of name is suitable. This second step involves the exercise of discre-
tion or evaluation.
Von Welck submitted questionnaires to the thirty-eight author-
ities, receiving a response from slightly over half. He found that
between 1966 and 1970 the responding authorities considered 4,724
requests for name changes; of these 3,776 were granted, 261 were
denied, 413 were withdrawn, and 274 remained pending. Further-
more, the administrative law courts were only rarely asked to inter-
vene after the denial of an application for a change of name: out of
the 261 refusals only 45 were challenged by court action-repre-
senting only 17% of all the requests turned down by the adminis-
tration and only 1% of all reported administrative proceedings.
Only in these few cases was judicial control of administrative dis-
cretion exercised, in spite of the legal possibility of judicial review
in every case.
Although it should not be overlooked that the field of activities
chosen by Von Welck is not typical of the manifold and frequently
much more contentious decisions of the executive branch, it can be
said in general that judicial control is not as comprehensive as is
usually assumed. His figures indicate that the theoretical possibility
of the review of administrative decisions by independent courts
must not be equated with the control exercised by administrative
law courts in reality.
10 See Kellner, Einiges zum behordlichen Ermessen, 1969 DO'V 309, 312.
" Von Welck, Rechtstatsachenuntersuchungen zum Verwaltungsermessen, 1973 DOV
732.
" Law of Jan. 5, 1938, [1938] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] 1 9.
[ (1961] Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt 13.
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The study suggests that the prevailing opinion that discretion-
ary injustice can be eliminated by a maximum of judicial review44
should be reexamined. At the very least, reliance on judicial review
to control discretion should be supplemented by efforts to
strengthen administrative procedure by developing generally ac-
ceptable standards that will enable administrators to resolve cases
of conflicting interests according to principles of equal justice. This
goal has been partly achieved by a very recent Federal Act of May
25, 1976 regulating the administrative procedure of federal agencies
and state agencies applying federal laws. 5 One provision of the Act
requires an authority exercising discretion to state the facts and
reasons for its decisions;46 another provides that an authority em-
powered to use discretion must exercise it in accordance with the
purpose of the authorization, and keep within the limits of discre-
tion set by the statute.47
At the same time the administration should overcome its suspi-
cion of judicial control. After World War II, at the beginning of our
young democracy, administrative authorities had to work under the
most dreadful circumstances. Administration was especially diffi-
cult in the fields of housing, where there was a tremendous shortage
of rooms and apartments, and food rationing. In both areas
thousands of executive decisions were made daily. The administra-
tion was afraid that the creation and reopening of administrative
law courts and the introduction of their comprehensive jurisdiction
would seriously hamper its daily work. It was surprised to discover,
however, that in the large majority of cases the courts upheld ad-
ministrative decisions. This was due not to any special judicial
friendliness towards the administration, but to the soundness of the
executive decisions. Because the executive is bound by law and
justice under the Constitution" the scope of judicial review man-
dated by section 114 of the Rules of Procedure for Administrative
Law Courts provides an adequate "check point" to set aside faults
and mistakes in the exercise of discretion by administrative agen-
cies, without unduly interfering with the freedom of the executive
branch to act.
" See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); H. EHMKE,
"ERMESSEN" UND "UNBESTIMMTER RECHTSBEGRIFF" IM VERWALTUNGSRECHT 49, 51 (1960); Von
Welck, supra note 41.
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVfG], [1976] BGBI 11253.
Id. §39(1) sent. 3.
47 Id. § 40.
GG art. 20(3).
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C. Discretion and Individual Rights
One of the more interesting recent decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court concerning the possible intrusion of administrative
discretion on constitutionally protected individual rights involved
the following facts.49 The regional management of the state-owned
German railroad at Karlsruhe from time to time invites up to
twenty news reporters to participate in press excursions by train.
The plaintiff, a news reporter who was entitled to attend press con-
ferences of the railroad, had not received invitations to attend any
of these instruction tours. He sued, asking that the railroad be
ordered to invite him to such excursions in the future, but the action
failed at all levels of the administrative courts. The Federal Su-
preme Court ruled that the plaintiff had no enforceable "right"
to go on these excursions. The Court found the limitation on the
number of participants in such excursions to be a matter of discre-
tion, qualified, however, by the constitutional principle of equal
treatment." Accordingly, the railroad could not select reporters
from "good" and "bad" newspapers, or invite only those who had
in the past reported favorably on the performance of the railroad or
of other public institutions. Similarly, the Court ruled that the prin-
ciple of freedom of the press was not at stake, provided the selection
of participants did not result in the regimentation of all or a part of
the press. In the present case there was no indication of such
regimentation since the plaintiff had not submitted any evidence
showing that his professional work was predominantly devoted to
transportation problems. Thus, his exclusion from the excursions
did not violate the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing a free
press.'
mH. CONCLUSION
More than 20 years ago, Professor Hans Huber observed that
the use of discretion-"the Trojan Horse of classical administrative
law" 512-had not yet been fully reconciled with the ideal of the rule
of law. This remains as true today as it was then.
" Judgment of Dec. 3, 1974, 47 BVerwGE 247.
GG art. 3.
5, GG art. 5.
52 Obermayer, Die Beurteilungsfreiheit der Verwaltung, 1975 BAYERISCHES VERWALTUNGS-
BLATTER 258.
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A. The Doctrinal Problem
The reason discretion rests uneasily within the German system
of law is that it necessitates a compromise between two fundamen-
tal and conflicting goals of the legal order. On the one hand, protect-
ing citizens from arbitrary applications of the executive power of the
state requires that citizens receive equal treatment under fixed and
ascertainable rules of law. On the other hand, the fullest realization
of justice in individual cases and the practical needs of the executive
often require that the decision maker have a measure of freedom to
recognize and weigh special circumstances and factors the legisla-
ture could not have anticipated or subsumed under a comprehensive
formula. Some instances of the need for administrative discretion
involve only expediency, such as the problems of the design and the
location of facilities in city planning. More often, administrative
discretion relates to problems of individualized justice: balancing
interests, minimizing governmental interference with individuals,
and ensuring uniformity of treatment.
The threshold question in the development of a legal doctrine
of discretion is whether the use of discretion is per se unconstitu-
tional. In ruling that it is not,"3 the Federal Constitutional Court
closed the door to the appealingly simple "radical approach" to the
problem of controlling discretion and set upon the difficult task of
developing legal principles to guide the exercise of discretion.
German legal doctrine in this area begins with the recognition
that the purposes served by administrative discretion do not require
an absolute freedom of decision, but can be fulfilled by a closely
restricted power to choose among several equally legal alternatives.
The degree of discretionary freedom granted to an administrator
varies considerably, but always within limits, and involves the facts
that he may consider, the manner in which his decision may be
reached, and the alternative solutions he may reach. The pertinent
statute may prescribe which values are to be considered and in
which sequence. However, even if the statute purports to grant "free
discretion" (freies Ermessen), the administrator is bound to decide
issues consistently with the purpose of the statute54 and in
accordance with general legal principles, whether they derive from
the Constitution or from the basic principle of the rule of law.
The present state of German legal doctrine regarding standards
for the exercise of discretion contains a curious anomaly. Although
33 See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 3, 1959, 9 BVerfGE 137.
s, VwVfG § 40, supra note 45.
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the relevant principles limiting the use of discretion-for example,
the principle requiring equal treatment-should be equally binding
no matter which source they derive from, in actuality the scope of
judicial review may depend on whether the pertinent principle is
recited in the relevant statute or is derived from the Constitution.
If the principle has been enacted in a specific statutory provision,
compliance with the standard is fully reviewable by the courts; if
the standard is derived from the Constitution, however, the admin-
istrative authority is granted a broader sphere of discretion.5 Of
course, when the relevant principle is derived from the Constitution
or the concept of the rule of law, the administrative authority may
not pursue its goals ad libitum, but must apply objective criteria,
balancing in a just and reasonable manner the various interests
affected. Thus, even in cases governed by constitutional principles
the exercise of discretion is not free, but is bound by the duty of the
administrators to act under the guidance of principles of law and
justice (pflichtmissiges Ermessen).
B. Institutional Controls on the Exercise of Discretion
The doctrinal reconciliation of the need for administrative dis-
cretionary powers and the ideal of the rule of law finds its parallel
in the arrangement of institutional safeguards against the abuse of
discretion. To protect citizens from errors in the exercise of adminis-
trative discretion, the German system has placed primary emphasis
on the review of administrative decisions" by special administrative
law courts having full independence from the executive. This struc-
ture is designed to accommodate the conflicting goals of the admin-
istration, which is responsible for carrying out legislative programs,
and of the judiciary, which is responsible for protecting individuals
from unlawful acts of the administration.
These competing interests and functions have sparked a con-
tinuing quest for reforms that will bring about an optimal balance.
One proposed reform would structure complex administrative pro-
ceedings as a series of distinct administrative acts, each subject to
review by the administrative courts. If the decision at each stage is
not contested at the time it is made, it is not subject to judicial
review at a subsequent step in the administrative process. This is
the practice, for example, in the assessment of property taxes, where
the valuation of real estate precedes the separate decree of the tax
5 Judgment of Apr. 26, 1968, 29 BVerwGE 304, 307.
5 Laubinger, Staatrechtslehrertagung 1975 (pt. 2), 91 DVB1 289, 290 (1976).
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assessment. However, the theory of successive administrative acts
seems unsatisfactory as a general solution to the problem of facili-
tating judicial review due to the delay and added costs it would
impose on the administrative system.
A critical point of potential conflict between administrators
and courts concerns the scope of the reviewing court's inquiry and
its power to impose an alternative outcome. It has to be remembered
that the exercise of discretion involves the realization of administra-
tive goals as well as the application of law to particular facts. The
power of judicial review is said to extend only to the latter aspect
of the administrator's act. This balance between executive and judi-
cial powers has been defined in section 114 of the Rules of Procedure
for Administrative Law Courts.
The role of an independent judiciary exercising a limited power
to review administrative actions has been challenged by a proposal
to create within the executive branch special boards empowered to
review administrative acts as to both their legality and their expedi-
ency." Administrative law courts would continue to be restricted
to a review of the legality of decisions involving the use of discretion.
The argument advanced in support of this proposal is that the
courts are too insensitive to the policies and objectives of the admin-
istration, but it is difficult to see how administrative review boards
would, in fact, be any more sensitive. At best, an additional organ
for review within the executive branch might be able to ascertain
and correct deficiencies in administrative practice-a function bet-
ter suited to an ombudsman than to formal review boards.51
The most recent development in the German law of administra-
tive discretion was the enactment on May 25, 1976 of the Federal
Law on Administrative Procedure.59 Some of the principal provi-
sions of this act pertain to matters already discussed, such as the
express provision that discretion must be exercised within the statu-
tory limits and according to the purpose for which it was author-
ized."0 In addition, however, the act requires that discretionary deci-
sions be accompanied in most cases by a statement of reasons dis-
closing the basis for the decision." The disclosure of reasons is not
11 ENQutrE-KOMMISSION FOR FRAGEN DES VERFASSUNGSREFORM, ZWISCHENBERICHT
[Enquete-Comm'n for Constitutional Reform, Intermediate Report], BUNDESTAGS-
DRUCKSACHE VI/3829 § 3.4.2 (Sept. 21, 1972).
s' Bullinger, Ermessen und Beurteilungsspielraum-Versuche einer Therapie, 27 NJW
769, 772 (1974).
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVfG], [1976] BGB1 1 1253.
6o Id. § 40.
" Id. § 39.
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only a fundamental requirement of fairness, but a prerequisite for
judicial review, as the administrative courts have long stressed. In
addition to these traditional tenets of administrative law, the 1976
Act contains procedural requirements that operate to improve the
quality of administrative justice without recourse to judicial review.
Among these are the provisions that citizens are authorized to
inspect pertinent records, 2 that applicants normally have a right to
a hearing prior to the rendering of a decision that could impair their
rights,13 and that the authorities are under a duty to advise citizens
about their rights in an administrative proceeding. The statute will
become effective on January 1, 1977. That it will have considerable
impact is already apparent.
Neither the improvements in administrative procedure-as
important as they may be-nor the creation of independent admin-
istrative boards with full competency to review matters of both fact
and law are sufficient to dispense with the control of administrative
discretion by independent courts hearing and deciding administra-
tive law cases. Since such courts do not exist to the same extent in
the United States as in the Federal Republic of Germany, Professor
Davis's professed desire for more justice in the field of discretionary
decision making remains an important and urgent goal in his coun-
try. This goal also remains important in Germany, however, where
it is still necessary to search for ways to assure expeditious and
effective individual legal protection, without unduly constricting
the free, creative activity that the administration needs in our cen-
tury of increasing demands for equal treatment and social justice. 5
12 Id. § 29(l).
- Id. § 28(1).
" Id. § 25.
Bullinger, supra note 58, at 773.
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